Professor W. B. Anderson'S paper ‘Livy and the Lexica’ in C.Q. XXV., 1931, pp. 38–48, prompts me to put together from my notes this further list of words and idioms used by Livy but not recorded in the lexica as Livian. With one or two clearly indicated exceptions, I have included nothing which is given in Lewis and Short, Forcellini-Corradini-Perin or Georges, and I have included nothing in which Mr. Anderson has anticipated me, except that in a few places I (...) have added to the citations he gives; but my citations make no more claim to be exhaustive than his do. I have given within parentheses the authors who are cited by the lexica for a particular word or use, but I have refrained from adding other authorities. (shrink)

Professor W. B. Anderson'S paper ‘Livy and the Lexica’ in C.Q. XXV., 1931, pp. 38–48, prompts me to put together from my notes this further list of words and idioms used by Livy but not recorded in the lexica as Livian. With one or two clearly indicated exceptions, I have included nothing which is given in Lewis and Short, Forcellini-Corradini-Perin or Georges, and I have included nothing in which Mr. Anderson has anticipated me, except that in a few places I (...) have added to the citations he gives; but my citations make no more claim to be exhaustive than his do. I have given within parentheses the authors who are cited by the lexica for a particular word or use, but I have refrained from adding other authorities. (shrink)

The authors reject arguments by Professor Joseph Fletcher (author of Situation Ethics) that in some circumstances parents may be held responsible for producing genetically defective offspring, but offer arguments of their own for the same conclusion. Their arguments could, they suggest, justify `wrongful life' claims by the genetically defective infant against the mother. While researching this paper both authors were postdoctoral fellows in medical ethics in the Program on Human Values and Ethics at the University of Tennessee Center for (...) the Health Sciences. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

The field of bioethics is calling for a new generation of scholars equipped with the normative, empirical, and practical knowledge and expertise to prioritize equity concerns largely underrepresent...

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.

Die Homerische Odyssee in der ursprünglichen Sprachform wiederhergestellt von August Fick. Göttingen, 1883.Die Homerische Ilias nach ihrer Entstehung betrachtet wad in der ursprünglichen Sprach-form wiederliergestellt von August Fick. Göttingen, 1885–1886.Philologus, xliii. 1. Dr. K. Sittl, ‘Die Äolismen der Hornerischen Sprache.’ ‘Herr Dr. Karl Sittl und die Hornerischen Äolismen’ von DR. Gustav Hinrichs. Berlin, 1884.Bezzenberger's Beiträge zur Kunde der Indogerm. Sprachen. Vol. xi. ‘Die Sprachform der altionischen und altattischen Lyrik.’ A. Fick.

According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...) against objections. (shrink)

Moral and social arguments weigh heavily against performing medical procedures solely for purposes of sex selection. The medical profession has a responsibility to abandon its posture of ethical neutrality and take a firm stand now against sex selection.

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...) against objections. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that any attempt to model changing the past will either be contradictory or really model avoiding the past. Using Nicholas Smith's (1997) argument as a basis, I formulate a generic version of this Avoidance Argument. I argue that the Avoidance Argument fails because (i) it involves an equivocation of what is meant by ‘bifurcation of the time of an event’ and (ii) resolving the equivocation results in the falsity of at least one of the premises. Hence, the (...) Avoidance Argument will not support the claim that changing the past is logically impossible. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, which describes the behavior of subatomic particles, seems to challenge common sense. Waves behave like particles; particles behave like waves. You can tell where a particle is, but not how fast it is moving--or vice versa. An electron faced with two tiny holes will travel through both at the same time, rather than one or the other. And then there is the enigma of creation ex nihilo, in which small particles appear with their so-called antiparticles, only to disappear (...) the next instant in a tiny puff of energy. Since its inception, physicists and philosophers have struggled to work out the meaning of quantum mechanics. Some, like Niels Bohr, have responded to quantum mechanics' mysteries by replacing notions of position and velocity with probabilities. Others, like Einstein and Penrose, have disagreed and think that the entire puzzle reflects not a fundamental principle of nature but our own ignorance of basic scientific processes. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards offers the general reader a deep and real understanding of the problems inherent to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, from its inception to the present. The book presents a balanced overview of current debates and explores how the theory of quantum mechanics plays itself out in the real world. Written from the perspective of a leading European physicist, the book looks extensively at ideas from both sides of the Atlantic and also considers what philosophers have contributed to the scientific discussion of this field. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards sets out what we know about the endlessly fascinating quantum world, how we came to this understanding, where we disagree, and where we are heading in our quest to comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible. (shrink)

Principles and the context, by J. C. Bennett.--Love monism, by J. M. Gustafson.--Responsibility in freedom, by E. C. Gardner.--The new morality, by G. Fackre.--When love becomes excarnate, by H. L. Smith.--Situational morality, by R. W. Gleason.--The nature of heresy, by G. Kennedy.--Situation ethics under fire, by J. Fletcher.

Despite a growing number of models argument for the logical possibility of changing the past there continues to be resistance to and confusion surrounding the possibility of changing the past. In this paper I shall attempt to mitigate the resistance and alleviate at least some of the confusion by distinguishing changing the past from what Richard Hanley calls ‘annulling’ the past and distinguishing both from what I shall call ‘otherwising’ the past.

We surveyed the approaches of 661 geneticists in 18 nations to 14 clinical cases and asked them to give their ethical reasons for choosing these approaches. Patient autonomy was the dominant value in clinical decision-making, with 59% of responses, followed by non-maleficence (20%), beneficence (11%) and justice (5%). In all, 39% described the consequences of their actions, 26% mentioned conflicts of interest between different parties and 72% placed patient welfare above the welfare of others. The U.S., Canada, Sweden, and U.K. (...) led in responses favoring autonomy. There were substantial international differences in moral reasoning. Gender differences in responses reflected women's greater attention to relationships and supported feminist ethical theories. (shrink)

A world in which time travel into the past occurred would seem like a most strange world. Nicholas Smith, however, in his ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel’, argues that time travel is not so strange as we think. In particular, he argues against what he views as the main reason time travel worlds seem so strange – the claim that time travel entails unusual numbers of coincidences. I shall argue that Smith's argument for rejecting the claim is inadequate. Hence, the (...) debate over the consequences of the coincidences of time travel cannot be avoided by denying the coincidences themselves. (shrink)

Numerous informal logi- cians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put. Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens construction formels et théoriciens de l’argument- ation limitent leur non de théories à ce qu’ils appellent des arguments « authentiques ». (...) Mais y-a- t’il une distinction claire entre des arguments« authentiques » et « inau- thentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre descriptions possibles de cette préten- due distinction et je soutiens qu’- aucune ne répond aux besoins théori- ques auxquels elles sont censées ré- pondre. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Über das Wesen der Naturgesetze" verfügbar.

David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument”, defends a recursive definition of ‘argument.’ I present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I argue that refining Hitchcock’s definition in order to resolve these problems reveals a crucial, but minimally explicated, relation that was, at best, playing an obscured role in the original definition or, at worst, completely absent from the original definition.